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Abstract

“clones” [10], predatory pricing under some conditions
[4], and providing an adapter [1]. Analyzing the
characteristics and influences of network externality can
help managers apply economic principles to improve on
their decisions such as product line design, pricing
strategies, property rights and taking advantage of lock-in
effect [18].
We follow the research [21] that explained why
challenger firm can win over incumbent firm in industries
characterized by network externality. Theoretically,
network externality stands on the incumbent’s side and
creates enormous switching costs for installed users, or
namely, the installed base. Based on the work [12],
challengers have little chance to successfully penetrate
into industries characterized by network externality.
However, it is interesting to note that in the history of
industry this theoretical inference is not followed. The
phenomenon that challengers win over incumbents takes
place again and again. [21] successfully explained the
phenomenon existed in growing markets. By contrast,
attacking strategies in this paper can explain the same
phenomenon even when markets do not grow in sizes.
One of the competitive strategies is seeking for
sponsorship. Sponsorship can help one of the oligopolists
to offer a lower price than marginal cost and thus gain
competitive edge against the rival [15].
Another frequently cited research [17] showed that
firms might race excessively and incompatibly in
research and development. The government can take on
the “force licensing” policy to slow down this race to
improve social welfare. Our paper, on the other hand,
proposes that the challenger firm can use local attacking
strategies without interventions of governments.
Before we introduce this paper’s purpose, we first
come to the precise deinition of “local attacking
strategies”. Marketing activities can be utilized to target
the whole market or to target at a specific segment.
Marketing activities, such as advertising or promotional
campaign, utilized to target the whole market can be very
expensive and lost of focus. On the other hand, marketing
activities can be utilized to target at a specific segment.
We name these marketing activites “local attacking
strategies” because they do not attempt to pursuade the
whole market, by contrast, a particular part of the market.
We will show that focusing on a rather small segment can
affect the choice of the whole market in the context of
network externality.
Briefly, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate that
attacking strategies by the challenger can destruct the

Network externality can encourage adoption when a
network is growing in size. Network externality, however,
can also encourage abandoning when a network is getting
small. Therefore, the challenger’s action focusing on
persuading a part of the market can eventually affect the
whole market when network externality is at work.
This paper discusses two local attacking strategies,
namely, “focusing on the high-end” and “focusing on the
low-end”, and compares their effects. The conclusions
show that the former strategy generally exhibits stronger
eventual effects than the latter. Although direct effects are
local, the eventual effects could be global when network
externality is strong and/or consumers have small
differences in their reservation prices.
Based on our results, the incumbent should set a price
keeping all installed users away from being stranded. If
any installed user gives up the incumbent’s technology,
he or she may be the fuse to trigger the chain reaction.
Thus, a better approach is to “make the fuse wet”. To the
challenger, local attacking strategies work better when
network externality is strong and/or reservation prices of
installed users are nearly the same.
Keyword: Network Externality, Attacking Strategies,
Targeting

1. Introduction
Network externality is the phenomenon that adopters’
utility increases with the number of equivalent adopters
[5] [6] [7] [14] [20]. Network externality has proven itself
as a hot topic in the fields of economics and management.
Moreover, it manifests undoubted relevance in
information economies. Telephone, email [3] and
computer operation systems are the most representative
products characterized by network externality. It also
exhibits the property of increasing return [2] [18], and
various inefficiencies [8] [11] therefore shaping a new
business model in information economies.
Applicable are conventional and classic strategic
thinking: building alliance, taking first-mover advantages,
and managing consumers’ expectation [19]. However,
various counter-intuitive but insightful strategies are
proposed and analyzed in the context of network
externality. For instance, allowing piracy in software
markets [9], planned obsolescence [13], introducing

incumbent’s installed base. In this paper, the effects of
two local attacking strategies are analyzed and compared.
One strategy is “focusing on the high-end” and the other
is “focusing on the low-end”. This paper will show that
local attacking strategies not only have local direct effect,
but also have global eventual effect on the number of the
incumbent’s installed users.
The attempt of this paper is new in the fields of
industrial organization and management science. Firstly,
this paper shows that network externality can amplify the
effect of a challenger’s attracking strategies. Although the
direct effect of attacking strategies is local, the strategic
effect amplified by network externality could be
enormous.
Explaining the similar phenomemon, this paper
attempts to extend [21] to explain the challenger’s victory
even without a growing market. The increasing return
property of network externality is well known but,
however, network externality also makes a network more
vulnerable when a network is under attack.
This paper is organized as follows. The current section
describes this paper’s purpose, importance and status in
the literature. The next section describes the model. The
third section solves the problem and discusses the results.
Finally, the conclusion is drawn.

2. Model
The model consists of one incumbent firm, one
challenger firm and a number (M) of users. The
incumbent possesses a technology and set a price for
usage right in a specific time period, for instance a year.
Every user in the market is assumed to have paid for the
technology in the previous time period but needs to
decide whether to pay the incumbent again for the
coming year’s usage. That is, the incumbent firm
occupies the market in the beginning of the model.
This paper does not analyze the dynamic and
competitive issues between the incumbent and the
challenger. The focus is put on the one-shot effect of the
challenger’s attacking strategies and network externality
between technology adopters. The analysis is limited to
the scope in which the challenger takes one strategy and
the incumbent is not ready to notice or react to the
challenger’s attack. Thus, the game theoretical view is
not applied on the interactions of the incumbent and the
challenger, but applied on the interactions between
technology adopters.
Since the challenger is new in the market, he/she may
concentrate his/her marketing resources to attract some
(locally), but not all (globally), of the consumers in the
market. Intuitively, “focusing on the high-end” and
“focusing on the low-end” are two candidate strategies.
The only decision to be made in this model is
challenger’s strategy.
Let us first elaborate these strategies. The term “highend” refers to consumers, who may have higher income
or wealth, possessing higher reservation prices. By
contrast, the other term “low-end” refers to consumers
possessing lower reservation prices. Moreover, “focusing

on the high-end” strategy is concentrating marketing
resources to target consumers with higher reservation
prices. On the other hand, “focusing on the low-end”
strategy is concentrating marketing resources to target
consumers with lower reservation prices for the
incumbent’s technology.
It is hard to judge which of these two strategies is
better. The former, “focusing on the high-end”, may lead
the challenger to seize a higher-margin segment as a
niche. On the other hand, “focusing on the low-end” may
help the challenger expand its market share in a higher
speed.
To reflect the direct effects of these two strategies, we
model the former strategy, “focusing on the high-end”, in
a way that a challenger moves the consumer with the
highest reservation price out of the incumbent’s installed
base. Similarily, we model the latter strategy, “focusing
on the low-end”, in a way that a challenger moves the
consumer with the lowest reservation price out of the
incumbent’s installed base. The consumer, who is
“targeted” by a challenger, “uninstall” the incumbent’s
system and stops using the incumbent’s technology, and
consequently leave no value to other consumers and the
incumbent.
The incumbent charges a price at the end of the model
to every consumer who decides to renew the contract
with the incumbent. One must notice that in this paper the
incumbent is assumed to set a price maximizing his/her
short-term profit without considering the competition.
Thus, the incumbent’s price is fixed when consumer
reservation prices and the strength of network externality
are given. In other words, the incumbent does not expect
the emergence of the challenger. Accordingly, this paper
does not attempt to provide any equilibrium but the
optimal move (the optimal local attacking strategy) for
the challenger.
To clearly identify every consumer and his or her
reservation price, we next sort and give subscript “ i ” to
consumers by their reservation prices. Moreover,
consumer Ci’s reservation price is called Pi . Accordingly,
The consumer with the lowest reservation price, P1, is
called C1 in this paper and correspondingly the consumer
with the highest reservation price, PM, is indexed as CM.
Consumers decide in a sequence of C1, C2, …, CM.
Therefore, we set that there are M periods and M
consumers. In the first period, the consumer (C1 or CM)
who is targeted by the challenger refuses to pay the
incumbent again. In the following M － 1 periods,
consumers decide in a sequence (C2, C3…, CM or C1,
C2, …, CM-1) and just one consumer decides in each
period, respectively. The sequence may reflect the reality
well because the consumer with a lower reservation price
is more sensitive to market change such as the
challenger’s strategic actions. On the contrary, the
consumer with a higher reservation price is more satisfied
with the incumbent’s system thus less willing to search
for alternatives.
The distribution of consumers’ reservation prices
indeed matters. We assume that distribution follows a

linear pattern of Pi ＝ a*i+b ＋ r*(n － 1), where “n”
represents the number of consumers who still are
installed users of the incumbent’s technology. That is, P1
equals a＋b＋r*(n－1) and PM equals a*M＋b＋r*(n－
1). The parameter “a” thus represents the reservation
price difference between consumers. On the other hand,
the parameter “r” therefore represents the strength of
network externality.
The linear pattern of reservation prices of consumers
is a approximity of uniform distribution setting [14]. On
the other hand, the linearity of network utility on the
number of adopters is following the model of [21] and
similar to the setting [16].
The incumbent’s price, P, also plays an important role
in the effectiveness of a challenger’s attacking strategies.
Intuitively, a higher price without losing any consumer
can generate the maximal short-term profit. How much
can the incumbent charge? In order to retain all of
consumers in the system, the price cannot exceed the
lowest reservation price P1 with n ＝ M. Moreover, any
price beneath P1, statically, does not attract more
consumers but only directly reduce the profit. To focus
on the effect of a challenger’s attacking strategies, the
price set by the incumbent is modeled to be P＝a＋b＋
r*(n－1). The price set by the incumbent is modeled as a
constant in this paper. The only decision is made by the
challenger to choose one of the two attacking strategies.
The model operates as follows. The incumbent sets a
price equal to P＝a＋b＋r*(n－1), equivalently a＋b＋
r*(M－1). Next, the challenger decides to target at CM,
the consumer with the highest reservation price, or C1, the
consumer with the lowest reservation price. These two
approaches are named “focusing on the high-end” and
“focusing on the low-end”, respectively. In the mean time,
the consumer targeted by a challenger does not pay the
incumbent again. Finally, the remaining consumers
decide whether to renew the contract with the incumbent
and pay the price in a sequence specified above. The
number of consumers who do not pay the incumbent
again measures the effectiveness of attacking strategies.
For easy reference, we list notations used throughout
this paper in the following.
Ci : the consumer with the ith low reservation price
Pi : the reservation price of Ci consumer
a: the reservation price difference between consumers
Ck and Ck+1, where k is an integer between 1 and M－1
r: the strength of two-way network externality
between any pair of consumers
n: the number of consumers who still use the
incumbent’s technology in the current period
M: the total number of consumers in the market
P: the price set by the incumbent which is equal to P1
with n＝M, that is, P＝a＋b＋r*(n－1)

3. Analysis

Now we start to analyze the first targeting strategy:
“focusing on the high-end”. A challenger concentrates his
or her marketing resources to target the consumer with
the highest reservation price. The effects of such
attacking strategy are shown as Figure 1.

Figure 1: Effects of “focusing on the high-end”
strategy
Firstly, the targeted consumer does not pay for the
incumbent’s technology (Effect I), that is the direct effect.
Since consumers’ reservation prices are constructed upon
other consumers’ equivalent adoptions, the reservation
prices of remaining consumers all drop an amount of r
(Effect II). Consequently, the reservation prices of some
consumers may fall beneath the incumbent’s price and
refuse to pay it (Effect III). Moreover, some other
consumers abandon the incumbent’s technology and the
reservation prices drop more. Those effects (Effects II
and III) form a self-reinforcing loop, which is triggered
by the “focusing on the high-end” strategy (Effect I).
Although only one consumer is affected initially by the
challenger’s strategy, more than one consumer is
eventually affected. The argument is proved more
rigorously in the following.
Proposition 1：
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the highend” strategy and

a
≥ 2 , eventually 2 consumers will
r

not pay for the incumbent’s technology.

Proof:
When consumer CM is targeted and does not pay the
incumbent again, all consumers’ reservation prices drop
an amount of r. Consumer C1’s reservation price now
becomes a＋b＋(M－2)*r, which is below the price, a＋
b＋(M－1)*r, set by the incumbent. Consumer C1 refuses
to pay the incumbent again. Next, consumer C2’s
reservation price thereafter becomes 2a＋b＋(M－3)*r,
which is above the price, a＋ b＋ (M － 1)*r, set by the
incumbent when

a
≥ 2 . Consumer C2 pays the price
r

and stays as an installed user and the stop-point of the
chain reaction of abandoning. The consumers (C3~CM-1)
with a higher reservation price than C2 deservedly pay the

price for the incumbent’s technology. Only C1 and CM are
affected by the challenger’s strategy. Proposition 1 is
proved.
Under another condition,

k
a k −1
≤ <
, the
k −1 r k − 2

effect of “focusing on the high-end” strategy would be
stronger.

Proposition 2：
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the high-

k
a k −1
≤ <
, eventually k
k −1 r k − 2

end” strategy and

consumers will not pay for the incumbent’s technology,
where k is a positive integer between 3 and M－1.

Proposition 3：
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the highend” strategy and

a M −1
<
, eventually all (M of)
r M −2

consumers will not pay for the incumbent’s technology.

Proposition 4：
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the highend” strategy and

a
< 1 , eventually all (M of)
r

strategy. When “a” is relatively small and “r” is relatively
large, the “focusing on the high-end” strategy can be
expected to have a larger effect on the incumbent’s
installed base.
For instance, players in online games interact
frequently and closely, that represents a stronger network
externality, namely larger “r”. Players in online game
industry mainly consist of students. They can be
considered to have similar reservation prices. A
challenger may concentrate his or her marketing
resources to offer attractive deals such as free usage or
cash rebate. According to the propositions above, the
challenger uses the “focusing on the high-end” strategy
and the remaining players lose contact to players who
refuse to pay the incumbent again and lose value from
communication with them. Some of remaining players
may feel dissatified and do not repurchase the
incumbent’s service. As more players swtich their choice,
the remaining players will tend to swtich also. Those may
form a self-reinforcing loop and make the “focusing on
the high-end” strategy very powerful to destruct the
incumbent’s installed base.
Now let us analyze the second targeting strategy:
“focusing on the low-end”. A challenger concentrates his
or her marketing resources to attract the consumer with
the lowest reservation price. The effect of such attacking
strategy is shown as Figure 2.

consumers will not pay for the incumbent’s technology.

When the four propositions are proved, we observe
that the incumbent’s installed base is more “fragile” when
reservation price difference between consumers (a) is
smaller and/or network externality (r) is stronger. The
more “fragile” the incumbent’s installed base is, the
higher the incentive for the challenger to launch an
attacking action.
To the incumbent, what are the ways to make the
installed base more “solid”? The reservation price
difference between consumers (a) is a characteristic of
the market and may be hard to change. On the other hand,
network externality (r) can be strengthened by technical
functions facilitating consumers’ interactions or
providing convenience to interact with friends by the
incumbent’s technology.
Intuitively, the incumbent shall enhance consumers’
value (r) from interactions. The installed base, however,
becomes more fragile when network externality (r) gets
stronger. Therefore, the incremental value from
interactions is double-edged to the incumbent. Its
advantage is that it helps the incumbent to achieve higher
performance in terms of consumer satisfaction or profits.
On the other side, it makes the incumbent’s installed base
more vulnerable. The double edge traps the incumbent
into a dilemma whether to add consumer’s value from
interactions.
To the challenger, the values of “a” and “r” can help
to estimate the effect of “focusing on the high-end”

Figure 2: Effects of “focusing on the low-end” strategy
First, the targeted consumer (C1) refuse to pay the
incumbent again (Effect I), that is the direct effect. Other
remaining consumers’ reservation prices drop an amount
of “r” (Effect II). Consequently, the reservation prices of
some consumers may fall beneath the incumbent’s price
and refuse to pay it (Effect III). Accordingly, more
consumers leave and the reservation prices drop more.
Those (Effects II and III) form a self-reinforcing loop,
which is triggered by the “focusing on the low-end”
strategy (Effect I). Although only one consumer is
affected, more than one consumers will eventually be
affected. The argument is proved more rigorously in the
following.
Proposition 5：

When the challenger uses the “focusing on the low-

a
end” strategy and
≥ 1 , eventually only 1 consumer
r

The “focusing on the high-end” and “focusing on the
low-end” strategies are the same effective when

will not pay for the incumbent’s technology.

Proposition 6：
When the challenger uses the “focusing on the low-

a
end” and
< 1 , eventually all (M of) consumers will
r

a
< 1.
r

To be clear, proposition 1 to 8 are summarized in
Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of two local attacking strategies

not pay for the incumbent’s technology.

Similar to propositions 1 to 4, propositions 5 and 6
also indicate that the incumbent’s installed base is more
“fragile” when reservation difference between consumers
(a) is smaller or network externality (r) is stronger. The
incumbent faces the same dilemma whether to facilitate
consumers’ interactions and add some value to
consumers via more convenient communication.
One may notice that the incumbent in this model set a
price that makes one consumer (C1) on the threshold of
paying for the incumbent’s technology or not. The
pricing rationale is most profitable in the short run or
without competitors. The single on-the-threshold
consumer, however, can be a fuse triggering the chain
reaction of abandoning due to network externality. One
intelligent way is to lower the price to take all consumers
away from the threshold point, that is, “make the fuse
wet”. Once the incumbent adopts such defensive strategy,
the challenger may face difficulties to trigger the chain
reaction by local attacking strategies.
Again we turn back to the challenger. The values of
“a” and “r” can help to estimate the effect of “focusing
on the low-end” strategy. When “a” is relatively small
and “r” is relatively large, the “focusing on the low-end”
strategy can be expected to have a larger effect on the
incumbent’s installed base.
For instance, word processing software (such as MS
Word) may be one of the markets consisting of
diversifying consumers. Students, professionals and
administrators may have different reservation prices. In
the model, the difference of consumer reservation prices
may be large. On the other hand, network externality may
be low to medium, that is, the value of “r” may be small.
Based on propositions 5 and 6, we have the theoretical
result that the challenger’s “focusing on the low-end”
strategy only has a limited effect.
When two local attacking strategies are analyzed, we
are on the position to compare their effects.
Proposition 7：
The “focusing on the high-end” strategy is more
effctive than the “focusing on the low-end” strategy when

a
≥ 1.
r
Proposition 8：

According to Table 1, we find that “focusing on the
high-end” strategy is superior to the “focusing on the
low-end” strategy in some cases however only the same
effective in other cases. To sum up, “focusing on the
high-end” strategy weakly dominates “focusing on the
low-end” strategy in the context of network externality.

4. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of two local attacking
strategies by a challenger. The “focusing on the high-end”
strategy is found superior to “focusing on the low-end”
strategy in some industry scenarios.
Two local attacking strategies are shown to have larger
eventual effects than the direct effects in the context of
network externality. That is, local attacking strategies
although only have limited direct effects but can trigger
the chain reaction, which results in larger eventual effects.
By analysis of this paper, a challenger can estimate the
effect of his or her local attacking strategies. When
consumers have same similar reservation prices, the chain
reaction is easier to be triggered and local attacking
strategies have significant effects. On the contrary, local
attacking strategies only have limited or local effects
when consumers are very distinct in their reservation
prices. The reason is that chain reaction is harder to be
triggered.
In addition to consummers’ heterogeneity in
reservation price, the strength of network externality
should be considered when estimating effects of local
attacking strategies. Strong network externality represents
larger value via communication between the consumers.
The power to strengthen and facilitate chain reaction is
stronger when network externality is stronger.
Accordingly, effects of local attacking strategies arise
with network externality.
On the contrary, weak network externality hardly
pushes the chain reaction to go on. Therefore, the effects
of local attacking strategies become weaker in the context

of weaker network externality.
From the incumbent’s point of view, it is unwise to
take over as much as consumers’ surplus in the industries
characterized by network externality. One consumer, who
is stranded or stand on the threshold of abandoning or not,
can be the fuse to trigger a scale of chain reaction. A
better approach is to adequately lower the price to leave
more surplus to consumers, that can be regarded as
“make the fuse wet” approach. Alghouth that approach
reduces the short-run profit, it can effectively retain the
installed base stable and subsequently the seat of
incumbent.
The strategic implication to the challenger is to find
the “fuse”, the consumer(s) who are least satisfied with
the incumbent’s current offering. “To light the fuse” can
effectively take advantage of network externality. The
better fuse is the high-end consumer(s) because of
stronger eventual effects theoretically guaranteed by
network externality. Practical targeting strategies are
offering “rebate when old exchanged for new” or “special
deal”, or concentrating advertising and channel efforts to
target at the better fuse.
Future researches extending or improving this paper
can: (1) analyze the value of the timeliness of incumbent
to stop the chain reaction, (2) provide defensive strategies
and analyze their effects, (3) form a sequential attackingdefending game for an incumbent and challenger, and (4)
consider the cost factors and subsequently provide a
decision support model.
In addition, network externality between consumers
may not always be anonymous, but local with identities.
That is, a research may extend this paper by considering
local network externality and find differences in results.
Another natural extension of this paper is to consider
different distributions of consumers’ reservation prices.
The form of distribution can indeed affect the effects of
attacking strategies.
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